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Restoration of wetland services: economic gains to the farmland owner 
 
Abstract 
The objective of this analysis is to describe and, if possible, measure gains that farmland 
owners may have seen because of the public’s demand for wetland services. To do so, we 
first consider landowners’ ability to directly sell onsite (hunting, fishing, wildlife 
viewing) and offsite (water quality, groundwater recharge, etc.) wetland services. We 
found little evidence that landowners sell wetland services. We then consider farmland 
owners’ gains from the mitigation banking system. We found that, with less than 200 
approved mitigation banks on farmland, farmland owners had some but limited 
opportunities to participate in mitigation markets. Finally, we consider landowners’ gains 
from the sale of wetland easements through the USDA’s Wetland Reserve Program 
(WRP). Although we are unable to quantify any gains, the popularity of the program 
suggests that landowners do gain by participating––since the mid-1990’s, more 
landowners have tried to enroll than program limits allow. Furthermore, two factors 
suggest that WRP gains are widespread. First, WRP easements have been sold in every 
State. And second, easement prices have increased over time which may indicate that 
owners of higher-valued lands may be seeing opportunities to participate.    3 
Introduction 
Wetlands were once considered to be wastelands and mosquito havens. As a result, there 
was strong public support for draining wetlands. Until 1980, the costs of draining 
wetlands were subsidized by the Federal government. The private sector also saw 
economic advantages to draining wetlands.  
 
Since 1980, the public has increasingly recognized the diversity of wetlands and the array 
of environmental services they provide (water quality improvements, floodwater 
retention, protection of endangered species, wildlife habitat, etc.). As a result, public 
support for wetland conversions has been replaced by efforts to discourage conversions 
and support wetland restorations. However, the private sector still sees economic 
advantages to draining wetlands. 
 
Most former wetlands are now in agriculture (Hansen, 2006). Data from the 1997 
National Resources Inventory (NRI) indicate that, in 1997, nearly 57 million acres of 
agricultural and private forest lands across the 48 contiguous States are converted 
wetlands. Since 1991, over 2.2 million acres of wetlands and associated uplands––less 
than 4 percent of the converted wetland acreage––have been restored. Most wetland 
restorations have occurred since 1982, as the public interest in wetland services grew. In 
recognizing public interest in wetland services, the Federal government established the 
‘no net loss’ initiative in 1982 and the ‘beyond no net loss’ initiative in 2004 and initiated 
programs to conserve and increase wetland services. 
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This analysis attempts to determine whether the demand for wetland services has 
benefited farmland owners. To do so, we first examine whether landowners have been 
able to sell access to wetlands for fishing, hunting, wildlife viewing. We found no 
evidence that suggests that landowners commonly sell wetland access. We also consider 
landowners’ opportunities to sell offsite services, such as floodwater retention, water 
quality improvement, and ground water recharge. Offsite services are public goods thus 
cannot be efficiently or effectively marketed, at least not without some intervention by 
the public sector. We then consider the economic gains farmland owners may have seen 
through mitigation banking. We found that, nationally, just over 400 mitigation banks 
were approved by 2005. The available data indicate that no more than half of these could 
be on former agricultural lands. Though limited, mitigation banking has given farmland 
owners an opportunity to create and sell wetland services and to sell lands and easements 
on lands to others who wish to enter the mitigation market. Finally, we consider how the 
USDA’s Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) may have benefited participants. To 
participate, landowners sell easements on farmlands that are then converted to wetlands. 
Although we are not able to estimate the size of any gains, the fact that the program is 
popular suggests that farmers gain by participating––since the early 1990’s, farmland 
owners have offered more lands than program limits allow. Two factors suggest that the 
program’s benefits are widespread. First, the WRP has restored wetlands in every State. 
And second, over time, economic opportunities may have reached a broader group of 
farmland owners––prices paid to landowners have increased which suggests that (given 
the easement-pricing criteria), owners of more-productive lands may be being accepted 
into the program.    5 
 
The marketing of services from existing wetlands 
Wetlands provide a wide variety of services, such as water quality improvements, 
floodwater retention, protection of endangered species, and fish and wildlife habitat. The 
diversity and mix of services provided by a single wetland depend on the type of wetland, 
where the wetland is located, and the state of the surrounding environment. In the case of 
new or restored wetlands, the level of services also depends upon the extent to which 
ecological conditions have recovered. The ecological conditions of some types of 
wetlands, such as prairie potholes, usually recover within five years. Ecological 
conditions of other types of wetlands, such as bottomland hardwoods, can take decades to 
recover.  
 
Some wetland services are enjoyed only when visiting the wetland, such as fishing, 
hunting, or wildlife-viewing opportunities. The wetland owner who can sell access to the 
wetland thus has an opportunity to market these services. Though there is evidence that 
such markets exist, we found no literature or data that indicate the level of economic 
activity associated with onsite wetland services. 
 
Other wetland services, such as groundwater recharge, floodwater retention, protection of 
endangered species, etc., are enjoyed offsite. Opportunities to sell offsite services 
generally do not exist because they are public goods. 
 
The marketing of services from new wetlands   6 
There is little evidence that rural landowners create or restore wetlands solely to sell 
increases in wetland services, despite the demand for wetland services. Available data 
suggest that wetland restoration costs are likely to exceed $200 per acre and the 
opportunity cost of the land is likely to exceed $600 per acre (based on WRP enrollment 
data). These estimates assume that wetlands are restored on agricultural lands where both 
restoration and opportunity costs are likely to be low.  
 
As with existing wetlands, landowners who restore wetlands may be able to sell access to 
onsite services. Landowners may also receive payments for creating offsite services from 
individuals, nonprofit organizations (NGOs), and others who are willing to pay for the 
one or more of the services, even though the services are public goods. For example, an 
NGO may pay landowners to restore wetlands to increase habitat for waterfowl. But there 
are likely to be some who have not contributed to the NGO yet benefit from increases in 
waterfowl populations and other wetland services. As long as some of the beneficiaries 
pay enough to cover costs, a landowner can profit by restoring a wetland. 
 
The marketing of mitigation bank credits 
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act––more commonly known as the 
Clean Water Act––has spurred more wetland restoration and creation than any other 
regulation. The objective of creating the wetlands is to offset losses. Having a goal of ‘no 
net loss,’ Section 404 requires that wetland losses be minimized and, when unavoidable, 
be offset by creating or purchasing compensatory wetland credits. Mitigation banks are 
wetlands that have been restored, created, enhanced, or (in certain circumstances)   7 
preserved expressly for the purpose of providing compensatory credits. Public and private 
entities create wetland credits for their own use or for sale to others. Credits, in nearly all 
cases, are measured in terms of wetland acres, but are meant to represent a level of 
wetland service. 
 
The market for wetland 
credits has created a 
demand for land 
suitable for wetland 
restoration, creation, or 
enhancement.  
Landowners have taken 
advantage of these demands by producing and selling wetlands credits and by selling 
easements on or ownerships of lands suitable to mitigation banking.  
 
Demand for wetland credits is fueled not only by Section 404 but by State statutes and 
regulations that authorize the use of mitigation credits––in 2001, 21 States authorized the 
use of mitigation banking credits (EPA, 2006). Since 1993, there has been a steady rise in 
the number of mitigation banks approved (figure 1).
1 By 2005, 405 mitigation banks were 
approved (Wilkinson and Thompson, 2006). Approximately 80 percent lie in 8 States––
Louisiana having the most, followed by Georgia, California, Florida, Virginia, Illinois, 
Texas, and Oregon (figure 2). While nearly half of all the mitigation banks lie in coastal 
                                                            
1 Approximately 75 observations have no approval dates. Our discussion assumes that the distribution of 
useable observations is representative of the distribution of all approved banks. 






































































































Source: ERS analysis of Environmental Law Institute data developed 
from reports of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Approximately 75 
percent of the observations do not include the year the bank was 
approved.   8 
areas (thus are not likely to have once been farmland), many also lie on rural lands that 
have little urban-development pressure and thus are likely to have once been farmland or 
forests.  
 
Because nearly half of all observations on mitigation banks do not report acreages, the 
actual number of wetland credits created is unknown. However, based on the acreages 
that are reported, mitigation banks have created more than 73,000 acres of wetlands  
 
The Wetland Reserve Program 
Figure 2. Location of mitigation banks and Population Interactive Zones for 
Agriculture (PIZA)* 
 
Source: ERS analysis of Environmental Law Institute data developed from reports of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers.  
*The PIZA areas identified are those where development pressures are prevalent. 
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The USDA’s Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) restores more wetlands than all other 
public and private efforts combined. The WRP, initiated in the 1985 Farm Bill and 
operated by USDA’s Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS), restores wetlands 
on agricultural lands and purchases easements on these lands to preserve each wetland 
and its services. Its initiation and continued funding reflects the public’s interest in 
wetland services.  
 
The popularity of the WRP indicates that landowners see gains in participating––more 
landowners wish to participate than the program limits allow—even though NRCS 
attempts to make enrollment contracts a break-even proposition (e.g., set easement prices 
equal the landowners’ willingness to accept)  NRCS pays either the difference between 
the land’s pre-easement agricultural value and its post-easement value, the price the farm 
requests, or an established minimum price, whichever is lower (USDA, NRCS, 2007). 
Because of a lack of data, we (and NRCS) are unable to estimate landowners’ 
willingness-to-accept and, hence, landowners’ gains. 
 
Two factors suggest that the program has provided many landowners opportunities to 
participate. First, since 1994, the WRP has accepted over 500 contracts (100,000 acres) 
annually (figure 3). By the end of 2005, the WRP had enrolled nearly 13,000 contracts 
and over 2.2 million acres. WRP contracts are found in every State. Approximately one-
third of all offers have been accepted. 
 
   10 


























































































Source: ERS analysis of WRP contract data 
 
Contracts are not 
distributed evenly 
throughout the country 
(figure 4). Sixty-three 
percent of all WRP 
contracts are in 10 
States––New York 
having the most, 
followed by Missouri, 
Iowa, South Dakota, 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Louisiana, Indiana, Illinois, and Mississippi––and 41 percent lie 
in the top five. 
Figure 4. Wetland Reserve Program contracts by county 
through 2005 
 
Source: ERS analysis of WRP contract data   11 
The distribution of the WRP acreages is similar to the distribution of the contracts (figure 
5). Sixty-seven percent of the WRP acreage lies in 10 States––Louisiana with the most, 
followed by Arkansas, Missouri, Mississippi, Florida, Iowa, Illinois, California, 
Minnesota, and South Dakota––and 40 percent lie in the top five (figure 5). Differences 
in the distributions of WRP contracts and acreages reflect differences in contract sizes. 
For example, despite having more contracts than all other States, New York contracts 
tend to be smaller thus it has less WRP acreage than several other States.  
 
The distributions of 
the WRP acreage and 
contracts suggest that 
opportunities to 
participate in the 
programs vary 
throughout the 
country.  However, 
variations in 
opportunities to enroll, to a large degree, reflect the distribution of converted wetland 
acreage (figure 6). Over 80 percent of all converted wetlands lie in ten States––Illinois 
with the most, followed by Minnesota, Iowa, Indiana, Arkansas, Ohio, Missouri, 
Mississippi, Michigan, and Louisiana––and 60 percent in the top five. 
 
Figure 5. Wetland Reserve Program acreage by county 
through 2005 
 
Source: ERS analysis of NRCS contract data   12 
The second factor that suggests WRP gains to farmland owners are widespread is that 
easement prices appear to have been increasing over time thus may be providing 
incentives to owners of more-productive lands to participate. This conclusion is based on 
the results of an analysis of WRP enrollment data. The results of the analysis show that, 
first, per-acre WRP easement prices have increased at a rate that appears to exceed the 
rate of farmland prices. And second, increases in easement prices are more significant in 
areas where WRP and mitigation acreage is greatest relative to the acreage of converted 
wetlands. Because easement prices are capped at the agricultural value of the land minus 




A model of WRP 
easement prices  
We estimate a model of 
easement prices to test 
the hypotheses that, 
first, the rate of increase 
in easement prices is 
greater than the rate of increase in agricultural land values and second, easement prices 
have increased most significantly in States where the ratio of wetland acres restored 
relative to the acres converted is greatest––that is, in areas where wetland restoration is 
depleting the stock of lands suitable to wetland restoration. Though we do not know the 
Figure 6. Converted wetland acreage by county, 1997 
 
ERS analyses of data from the 1997 National Resources Survey   13 
actual number of wetland acres restored on agricultural lands––WRP and mitigation bank 
acreages include upland acreage and probably less than half of all mitigation banks were 
once agricultural lands––we assume that the acreage restored is proportional to the sum 
of the WRP and mitigation bank acreages. Estimates of converted wetlands come directly 
from the 1997 National Resources Inventory (NRI). Ratios are greater than 0.3 in South 
Carolina, followed by Colorado, Utah, Arizona, Florida, and Montana (figure 7).  
 
Ratios of enrollments 
relative to conversions 
could not be calculated 
for earlier years because 
only the 1997 NRI 
reported converted 
wetland acreage. Thus 
1997 and earlier years 
are not included in the 
regression analysis.  
 
One enrollment criterion requires NRCS to set easement prices equal to the agricultural 
value of the land, minus any remaining value of the program acreage. State offices use 
appraisers to determine appropriate easement prices. Because of this criterion, easement 
prices can be expected to rise with increases in farmland values. Furthermore, because of 
Figure 7. Total WRP and mitigation bank acreage relative to 
prior converted wetlands 
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this criterion, we know that easement prices will increase faster than farmland values if 
more productive, thus higher valued, lands enter the program.  
 
High appraisal costs suggest that calculating easement prices may, in some cases, involve 
extensive data collection and analyses––appraisal costs are $10,000 or more for nearly 
2,000 contracts and $100 per acre or more for over 2,500 contracts. The model used here 
is simple, thus cannot be expected to provide accurate estimates of easement prices, but 
does provide a means of testing the easement-price effects of wetland restorations.  
 
We were not able to acquire county-level land-value data, but we did obtain county-level 
farmland rental data. The easement pricing model recognizes that: 
1)  rental rates represent the return to land. 
2)  the agricultural value of an acre of land represents the discounted present value of 
its expected future returns; 
3)  farmland rental rates vary within and across counties; 
 
We assume that:  
1)  when choosing between two contracts that differ only by the easement price, a 
State NRCS office will choose the lower-cost easement; 
2)  the independent variables in the model are uncorrelated with the excluded 
variables; 
3)  across the observation years, farmland rental rates in year t are proportional to 
rates in year t+1.   15 
 










, , ) ( ) ( δ β α  
 
Where: 
Pi,j,t  ¸ easement price of observation i, located in county j, paid in year t (2005 $) 
α  ¸ intercept 
rentt  ¸ the 2005 county-level farmland rental rate of county j 
βk   ¸ productivity coefficient for observations in year k 
dk   = 1 when k = t; 0 otherwise  
hk  = 1 when k = t and the observation is in SC, CO, UT, AZ, FL, or MT; 0 otherwise 
δk  ¸ difference in productivity coefficients for SC, CO, UT, AZ, FL, or MT in year  
k 
ei     ¸ error term. 
 
Note that hk equals one when the observation lies in one of the six States where the ratio 
of restored wetlands relative to converted wetlands is greater than 0.3. Though this is a 
somewhat arbitrary cutoff, note that the ratios in the top six States are at least 30 percent 
higher than Wyoming’s (figure 7).  
 
To understand what the β’s represent, consider these scenarios. First, lets consider a more 
ideal case where 1) we did have county-level data on land sale values for years 1998   16 
through 2005 (thus, in the above equation rentt would equal land values in year t), 2) 
there was no variation in land values within counties, 3) there was no post-easement 
value of the land, and 3) NRCS estimates of land values were fairly accurate. Then, 
because NRCS would set easement prices equal to the value of the land, the β’s would 
equal one.  
1.  Suppose we only had observations on land values for 2005. Then, if we 
substituted the 2005 values for the missing values and there’s been an upward 
trend in land values, then the β2005 would equal one and the others would be less 
than one. 
2.  Suppose we did have land sale values for all years but all post-easement values 
were greater than zero, then  
o  If the post-easement values were proportional to the value of land, then the 
β’s would be proportionally smaller, but the relative values of the β’s 
would not change, which would not affect our conclusions since we are 
interested in the differences in the relative sizes of the β’s. 
o  There could be a problematic bias under other scenarios. 
3.  Suppose there was some variation in land sale values within counties and reported 
values were county means, then: 
o  If NRCS selected the least-cost easements, NRCS would end up selecting 
higher-valued easements as stocks of the lowest cost easements were 
exhausted. As a result, the β’s on observations in earlier years would be less 
then the β’s on observations in subsequent years.    17 
o  If NRCS selected easements regardless of cost so that easement prices varied 
randomly around the county land value, then the β’s would equal one. 
4.  If rental values were used instead of land values, then the β’s would be greater than 
one. The value of the β’s would equal the discounted value of expected future rental 
rates when the observed rental rate is $1.00 (e.g., the per-acre value of land that 
generates $1.00 in rent). 
 
Given 1, 2, 3, and 4 and the assumptions made, we expect the β’s to be positive and 
greater than one, to be increasing if land values are, and to increase faster than land 
values if NRCS is selecting lower-costs easements first. 
 
The value of the δ is an extension of the above. That is, in States where WRP acreages 
relative to the total stock of converted wetlands lands are greatest, then increases in the 
β’s in these States will be greater than in others. The δ’s represents the increased value of 
the β’s.   
 
Data 
Easement price data for years 1998 through 2005 come from NRCS easement contract 
data. These data include the observation year and county where the contract is located. 
The county-level farmland rental data are from the Farm Services Agency (FSA). The 
Department of Labor’s producer price index is used to deflate nominal values 
(http://www.bls.gov/ppi/). Data behind the remaining variables are as discussed above. 
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Results 
Results are not inconsistent with prior expectations in that, first, all β’s are positive and 
greater than one (note that the dummy variables are ‘on-off switches’ for continuous 
variables and not stand-alone variables). And second, all but one of the δ’s are positive.  
 
To test the null of the first hypothesis––that the rate of increase in easement prices is 
greater than the rate of increase in agricultural land values––the rate of increase in the β’s 
would have to be tested against the rate of increase in farmland values (the implications 
of estimates of the  δj’s are discussed below). We were unable to obtain annual county-
level data on the agricultural land values. Thus we are unable to test the null of our first 
hypothesis. However, we do know that, at the national level, nominal (real) agricultural 
land values have increased approximately 5 (2) percent annually between 1987 and 2002 
(USDA, ERS, 2005). We also know that estimates of the βk’s indicate that real easement 
prices increased 4, 11, 11, and 30 percent annually from 1998 to 2002, which offers some 
evidence—but no proof—that easement prices are rising faster than land vales.   
 
If the null of the second hypothesis holds, then the (hk)*rentj variables do not increase the 
explanatory power of the pricing model. To test this hypothesis, the pricing model is re-
estimated with the δ’s set equal to zero and the difference in explanatory powers of the 
models is evaluated. We found F8, 7173=2.42 which is greater than F0.05, 8, 7173=1.94, thus 
we reject the null and accept the hypothesis that easement prices are significantly higher–
–relative to the land’s agricultural value––in States where the ratio of wetland acres 
restored relative to the acres converted is greatest.    19 
 
These results, along with the conditions and assumptions outlined above, provide some 
evidence that landowners with more-profitable farmlands may be gaining opportunities to 
participate in the WRP. Easement prices rise because, in the earlier years, the least-cost 
easements (reflecting the least-productive soils) were selected. In subsequent years, the 
remaining lands are more productive hence easement prices rise. 
 
Summary 
The objective of this analysis is to describe and, to the extent possible, measure farmland 
owners’ gains from the public’s demand for wetland services. To do so, we first consider 
the level of economic activity associated with the sale of services of new and existing 
wetlands. We found only anecdotal evidence that landowners sell onsite (hunt, fish, or 
view wildlife) and offsite (water quality, groundwater recharge, etc.) wetland services.  
 
Second, data on the number and location of approved mitigation banks provide some 
insight into farmland owners’ gains from mitigation banking. The public’s interest in 
preserving wetland services motivated legislation that created a mitigation banking 
system. The system requires losses in wetland services to be off set by the creation of 
new services. Thus farmland owners can 1) restore wetlands and sell the new services 
and 2) sell suitable lands to entities interested in producing services. With over 400 
mitigation banks approved, and nearly half on coastal lands, as many as 200 banks might 
be on former agricultural lands. And, since a land owner can own more than one bank, it 
is likely that no more than 200 farmland owners could have seen economic gains due to   20 
mitigation banking, but the data do not provide specifics on farmland owners’ 
participation. Therefore, we are unable to determine whether farmland owners have 
gained for the development of the mitigation markets.  
 
Finally, we consider whether farmland owners’ have gained from USDA’s Wetland 
Reserve Program (WRP). The WRP was motivated by the public’s interest in increasing 
wetland services. Although they could not be measured, the popularity of the program 
suggests that gains exist––more farmers attempt to participate than the program limits 
allow. Two factors suggest that any gains from WRP are likely to be wide-spread. First, 
the program is relatively large––over 2.2 million acres have been enrolled. Landowners 
in every State have taken advantage of the program. And second, over time, easement 
prices have increased which suggests that owners of more-productive lands may be 
gaining opportunities to participate. 
   21 
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Table1. Regression results 
                                 Parameter       Standard 
        Variable            Estimate            Error      t-Value    Pr > |t| 
 
        Intercept           306           20.04        15.28      <.0001 
        β98    7.59          0.35        21.51      <.0001 
        β99    7.85          0.41        18.96      <.0001 
        β00    8.74         0.39        22.32      <.0001 
        β01    9.24          0.39        23.45      <.0001 
        β02    11.99          0.42        28.48      <.0001 
        β03    13.11          0.40        32.46      <.0001 
        β04    13.57          0.40        34.20      <.0001 
        β05    13.72         0.41        33.78      <.0001 
        δ98           2.86          3.64         0.78         0.4325 
        δ99                     5.60          3.77         1.48        0.1378 
        δ00                     8.22            3.67         2.24        0.0249 
        δ01                     4.26          3.08         1.38        0.1664 
        δ02                     4.89          3.13         1.56        0.1178 
        δ03                     5.70          3.05         1.87        0.0619 
        δ04                     6.76          3.20         2.11        0.0348 
        δ05                     -0.49            3.75        0.13        0.8950 
 
Adj. R-Sq = 0.22 
 